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IndianaJones, famous scholar and archaeologist, is walk­
ing along a booby-trapped corridor in an ancient temple. 
When he happens to step on a triangular blue flagstone, a 
poisoned dart fires from the ceiling, barely missing him. He 
continues another few paces, and steps on a second triangu­
larblue flagstone; another dart fires, missing his head by only 
inches. This pattern happens five or six times, until Indiana 
Jones forms the causal belief, "if I step on a triangular blue 
flagstone, a dartwill fire atme." He avoids the next flagstone, 
grabs the golden idot and return safely to America. Later 
thatweek, he happens to be walking down the corridar of the 
small college where he teaches. As he turns the corner, he 
realizes he is about to planthis foot on a small, triangularblue 
flagstone. Immediately, the thought occurs to him, "Dh oh, 
darts!" After a second thought, he steps down on the flag­
stone, survives, and h,eads off to his class. 
Hume's notorious account of causal inferences, in which 
"all reasonings are nothing but the effect of custom," claims 
that we have no reason for making the causal inferences that 
we do. In this theory, Indiana Jones forms the inference "if I 
step on a triangular blue flagstone, a dart will fire at me" 
solely by force of custom: after observing the constant con­
junction of flagstone-stepping and dart-firing, custom leads 
his imagination to associate the impression of the former 
with the idea of the latter. Once he has developed a sufficient 
custom, Indiana Jones' imagination automatically jumps to 
the idea of dart-firing whenever it has the impression of 
flagstone-stepping. 
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This example raises a serious problem for Hume' s theory 
of causal inferences. We do not simply endorse every causal 
inference that occurs to us. When walking down the college 
corridor, Indiana J ones is reasoning on something other than 
the custom he has acquired in the Temple of Doom - he 
chooses not to endorse the inference" if I step on this flag­
stone, a dartwill fire atme./1 Can Hume still claim that all our 
reasonings are nothing more than the effect of custom? If all 
causal inferences are unreasonable, why does Indiana Jones 
not endorse the belief he formed in the Temple of Doom? 
In Section XIII of Part III of the Treatise, Hume argues for 
a naturalistic theory that allows us to make normative judg­
ments about causal inferences. This theory relies on an 
account of general rules, causal beliefs that generalize over 
many different experiences of inference-making. While Hume 
intends for general rules to distinguish between 11 good" and 
"bad" causal inferences, his argument often seems confusing 
and contradictory: general rules figure as both /I rash" and 
"unphilosophical probabilities", as well as guides by which 
to distinguish our causal judgments from the activity of the 
imagination. If we approach general rules from an external! 
objective stance, in which we judge the goodness of causal 
inferences by some standard external to the agent, we face 
great difficulty in resolving this contradiction. It is only ifwe 
adopt an internal! subjective stance, in which we judge the 
goodness of ca usal inferences by the beliefs an agent already 
has, that we can understand Hume's intended role for gen­
eral rules. In this interpretation, general rules can both. 
subvert and reinforce the customs which form our beliefs ­
through an equilibrium process in which we seek consis tency 
among our beliefs/ customs, we can distinguish between 
those inferences which we ought to hold and those we ought 
not. 
The potential problem with his naturalistic account of 
causality is not lost on Hume. In Section XIII, he describes the 
possible implications of his naturalistic account of belief, and 
the role that custom plays in forming belief: 
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It may, therefore, be concluded, that our judgment 
and imagination can never be contrary, and that 
custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such 
a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This 
difficulty we can remove after no other manner, than 
by supposing the influence of general rules. (Hume 
149) 
Though Hume never explicitly provides a definitional dis­
tinction between judgment and the imagination, we might 
ascribe the following view to him: the imagination is the 
faculty that forms beliefs, and the judgment is the faculty that 
gives its approval to them. But even if we are to make the 
distinction along these normative lines, we have to acknowl­
edge that we cannot judge causality by a different standard 
than imagination, since they are both "judgments" and the 
conclusions of the "imagination" are formed by custom. 
Hume's answer to this ostensible paradox lies in the roles that 
/I general rules" play in causal inferences. 
Although Hume is vague about the content of general 
rules, he indicates several ways in which they are used. 
Hume cites prejudice as a prime -example of an 
"unphilosophical species of probability ... derived from gen­
eral rules, which we rashly form to ourselves" (Hume 146). 
Several pages later, he characterizes them as /Irules form'd on 
the nature of our understanding, and on our e'xperience of its 
operations in the judgments we form concerning objectsTl 
(Hume 149). Hume also provides a functional definition of 
general rules: in two passages, the first following the previ­
ous quotation and the second in Section XV, he claims that 
they allow us to distinguish between causes and accidental 
circumstances. 
When Burne says that general rules are "form'd on the 
nature of our understanding, and our experience of its opera­
tions/' he implies that general rules are a way of categorizing 
our experience of inference-making. This idea of generality 
first appears in Section VIII, where Hume accounts for how 
we form ca usal beliefs upon only a single instance of conjunc­
tion. Although he does not refer to general rules in this 
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context, there is a strong similarity between his explanation 
in Section VIII and his later development of general rules. 
Hume acknowledges that we often seem to arrive at causal 
beliefs without the aid of custom, by only observing a single 
instance of conjunction of two events. Take the example of a 
baker who has never made a souffle before, and accidentally 
leaves it in the oven overnight. In the morning, he returns to 
find it inedibly burned. Right away, the baker believes his 
souffle will be ruined if he leaves it overnight again. This 
poses a challenge for Hume's account of how we form causal 
beliefs: it is hard to say that custom is responsible for the 
baker l s belief, since this is the first time hehas been faced with 
this particular incident. 
Bume replies to this objection by expanding our defini­
tion of custom. While we have had only one experience of 
souffle-burning and overcooking, "we have many millions 
[of experiences] to convince us of this principle; that like 
objects, plac'd in like circumstances, will always produce like 
effects" (Hume 105). Hume does not mean to claim that we 
have a rational justification for believing that the future will 
resemble the past. Rather, in keeping with his theory, he 
argues we come to form a broad habit of expecting the future 
to resemble the past. We could picture the imagination, in 
Hume's theory, as a short-order cook in a diner (the custom­
ers representing impressions, and the entrees ideas). If Bob 
asks for a ham-and-swiss sandwich twenty times in a row, 
the cook will immediately go andmake the sandwich the next 
time she sees him, without waiting for him to ask. After 
meeting enough students like Bob who routinely ask for the 
same dish, the cook develops a peculiar manner of dealing 
with her customers: if Jill only asks once for a hamburger, the 
next time the cook spots Jill she will immediately run off to 
make a hamburger. Thus, she has developed through custom 
the principle that"customers will always want the same dish 
they've requested in the past," which is analogous to the 
imagination's principle of "like objects, plac' d in like circum­
stances, will produce like effects." 
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Through this example, we can better understand what it 
might mean to have a general custom. In his account of how 
we form general rules, Hume relies on"the nature of custom 
not only to operate with its full force, when objects are 
presented, that are exactly with those to which we have been 
accustomed; but also to operate in an inferior degree, when 
we discover such as are similar" (Hume 147). This suggests 
that general rules are a kind of broad custom, akin to the one 
formed by the short-order cook, in which we habitually 
believe that certain patterns of experience will repeat them­
selves. Prejudice, therefore, is a general rule - custom leads 
us to generalize our experience under one broad banner, 
regardless of whatparticular experiences might indicate. For 
example, let us say we have observed that Bob, Fred, and Joe 
(who all happen to be Cretan) are compulsive liars. Instead 
ofjustformingthe particular rule that Bob, Fred, and Joe will 
continue to be liars, our imagination is often makes general 
rule that all Cretans are liars. 
So far, general rules have allowed Hume to explain how 
we could make the inference, "If I leave a souffle in the oven, 
it will get ruined," even if we have only baked cakes ­
looking back on our experience, we form the general rule that 
all dough products behave similarly. Still, we have not yet 
gotten general rules to explain why we consider some infer­
ences good and others bad. To make rna tters more confusing, 
Hume's normative stance towards general rules often seems 
contradictory. He deems prejudice a "rash" form of 
"unphilosophical speculation," yet argues that general rules 
aid us in separating causes from accidental circumstances. If 
all causal inferences are unreasonable, one wants to ask, why 
does Hurne consider prejudice unphilosophical? How are 
we supposed to Simultaneously employ and steer clear of 
general rules? 
First, let us consider whyHume might think general rules 
are unphilosophical. Intuitively, we think that the general 
rrue "all Cretans are liars" is rash when we have met only 
three liars who happen to be Cretan. On this view, the 
unphilosophicality of a general rule is a function of how 
GENERAL RULES AND THE NORMATIVITY OF CAUSAL INFERENCES 19 
much experience we have had. We tend to approach general 
rules from an external standpoint - we think that the infer­
ence, II all Cretans are liars/' fails to meet an objective stan­
dard of what constitutes causality. Given more experience, 
we believe, we should eventually feel secure in our inference. 
Burne takes a completely different view: our causal infer­
ences, no matter how much experience we have had, are 
never reasonable. Even if we had met the entire population 
of Crete except for one person, and discovered them all to be 
liars, we would still have no reason to expect the last person 
to be a liar. Therefore, it would be difficult to ascribe an 
external standard of causality to Hume - we cannot endorse 
our general rules on the basis of their past empirical evidence. 
Before we consider what Burne's normative stance might 
be, it is important to examine how we use general rules to 
modify our beliefs. After accounting for the natural mechan­
ics of how we form general rules, Bume tries to explain how 
we use general rules to /I regulate our judgment./1 Returning 
to the Indiana Jones example, we can see the particular rule 
of cause and effect that he formed by habit in the Temple of 
Doom: "If I step on a triangular blue flagstone, a dart will fire 
at me./I When Indiana Jones is about to step on the flagstone 
in the corridor, he believes for a moment that a dart will fire 
at him. But, he has also had countless encounters with 
triangular blue flagstones in the past, not to mention similar 
flagstones of different shape and color. From repeated expe­
riences of stepping on flagstones with no ill effect, Indiana 
J ones has formed the general rule that "In general, if I step of 
a flagstone, nothing bad is going to happen to me." 
Why does Indiana Jones end up acting on the general rule 

and not the first causal inference? Hume addresses this 

conflict between a general rule and another causal principle 

in Section XIII: 

But as this frequent conjunction Ie.g. of triangular 
blue flagstones and darts] necessarily makes it have 
some effect upon the imagination, in spite of the 
opposite conclusion from general rules, the opposi­
tion of these two principles produces a contrariety in 
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our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe the one infer­
ence to our judgment, and the other to our imagina­
tion. The general rule is attributed to ourjudgment; as 
being more extensive and constant. The exception to 
the imaginationi as being more capricious and uncer­
tain. (Hume 149) 
According to Bume, we endorse the general rule on account 
of its "extensive and constant nature," as opposed to the 
" capricious and uncertain" qualities of the other causal infer­
ence. Therefore, we judge according to the general rule and 
dismiss the other inference as misleading. It is difficult to 
develop a consistent reading of these claims - as we saw in 
the Cretan example, from an external! objective standard, the 
consistency of our experiences does nothing to change the 
unreasonableness of our inferences. What can Hume mean, 
then? If Hume is talking about extensiveness, constancy, 
capriciousness and uncertainty, he must not be referring to 
how general rules categorize our past experience. 
Before we give up on the external/objective stance on 
causality, it is worth considering w hat Bume says to suggest 
it. When referring to the ways in which general rules modify 
other beliefs, he claims if we II take a review of this act of 
mind" when we make inferences, we can"correct this pro­
pensity (towards particular rules] by a reflection on the 
nature of those circumstances," and "learn to distinguish the 
accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes" (Hume 
150, 148, 149). Taking a review, correcting, learning, and 
reflection all imply an active frame of mind, a process of self­
conscious reasoning. Italmost suggests that we have reasons 
for the conclusions we make after reflecting back on past 
experience through general rules. 
Despite this evidence, the external! objective stance seems 
untenable. A major aspect of Bume's methodology has been 
to show that what we, as first person observers, take to be 
reasons, a "scientist of human nature" could account for as 
simply the work of custom. Ifwe accept his theory of causal 
inferences, it becomes clear that we can never justify any 
particular causal inference on an external/objective ground 
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- His unreasonable to believe it, butitis ournature to believe 
it anyway. We might as well replace our usage of "causal 
belief" with IIcustom." 
But perhaps we can take a different stance from the 
external/ objective, and regard ourselves from the internal/ 
subjective perspective of minds that already have customs. 
Given a set of customs which we hold, some recent and others 
long-standing, when is a new custom good or bad? From this 
perspective, we can make better sense of Hume's emphasis 
on consistency and constancy in making normative judg­
ments. Let us say that we have a set of customs A,B,C... ,Y, 
and suddenly we develop custom Z. Should we endorse it? 
According to this interpretation of Hume' s passage onp.149, 
Zwould be a good custom if it does not conflict with customs 
A through Y. What happens if custom Y conflicts with 
custom Z? We already know, on the basis of having a set of 
customs, that custom Y is consistent with customs A through 
Z. Therefore, based on its consistency and constancy, we 
should accept custom Y. Custom Z is capricious and uncer­
tain with respect to ourother customs; therefore, we attribute 
it to the mechanical workings of our imagination. 
Hume appears to say something to this effect in his 
description of the conflict between general rules. General 
rules can allow us to "compare [a new belief/custom] with 
the more general and authentic operations of the under­
standing, [and] find it to be of an irregular nature, and 
destructive of the most established principles of reasoningsi 
which is the cause of our rejecting it" (Hume 150). By the 
"most established principles of reasonings" we could inter­
pret Hume to mean our most established customs, since as he 
has argued before, all causal reasonings are the work of 
custom. 
Onone level, this might be considered circular reasoning. 
Why should we have any faith in customs A through Z to 
begin with? This kind of objection forces us to change stances 
- in order to hold the intemalist/subjective stance, we have 
to assume that lithe curtain rises" with our mind holding 
certain customs. This does not necessarily imply that we are 
born with innate customs, only that we must refer ournorma­
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tive judgments about new customs to our old ones. Another 
objection might be that judging on the basis of prior customs 
is not normative. Saying that we ought to do something 
suggests that there is a good reason for doing it: how can a 
custom provide a reason? This objection can be best an~ 
swered by example. Let us say that after having spent a 
semester studying in England, I developed the custom of 
driving on the left side of the road. As soon as I return to 
America, my newly~formed custom draws me towards driv­
ing on the left. Should I endorse this custom? The answer is 
no, since it conflicts with my much deeper-held custom of 
driving on the right in America. This is a normative judg­
ment about what I should do, even though it rests on achiev~ 
ing a consistency of customs. 
What happens, one might ask, when a new belief sup~ 
plants an old one? Why ought we to endorse a new custom 
over an old established custom? According to the internal! 
subjective interpretation, we can only replace an old custom 
if the new one provides greater consistency among the other 
customs. When the physicist Paul Dirac discovered that one 
of his equations presupposed the existence of the positron, a 
sub-atomic particle which had not been experimentally con­
firmed, he chose to believe his equation over the experimen­
tal evidence. Why? For the reason that his customof trusting 
mathematical equations was deeper entrenched than his 
custom of trusting experiments - the positron, if it existed, 
would provide a much greater consistency among all his 
other mathematical beliefs than any other accepted theory. 
The implication of this view is that even the most unset­
tling experience cannot upset all your beliefs, since you need 
some deeply held belief to endorse this new experience. One 
could argue that even Descartes the rationalist was aware of 
this, when he refused to commence his descent into skepti­
cism without a few provisional principles. Our reading of 
Hume's paradoxical idea - that a general belief can only be 
subverted through recourse to another general principle _ 
can help to explain a particularly cryptic passage from Cha p_ 
ter XIII: 
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Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure 
of observing a new and signal contradiction in our 
reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be 
subverted by a principle of human nature, and again 
sav'd by a new direction of the very same principle. 
The following of general rules is a very 
unphilosophical species of probability; and yet 'tis 
only by following them that we can correct this, and 
all other unphilosophical probabilities. (Hume 150) 
We can understand this passage in the following way. From 
what we can gather from Hume's examples, it seems that 
most of the causal inferences we make in day-to-day experi­
ence are general rules, not "pure" causal inferences. For 
instance, Indiana Jones' inference that triangular blue flag­
stones in the Temple of Doom were deadly was also a general 
rule, since we canbe fairly sure that those flagstones were not 
completely identical. Likewise, his inference that most flag­
stones are safe was a general rule, as was shown earlier. 
Indiana Jones arrives at his judgment through anequilibrium 
process, weighing all his beliefs/ customs in order to attain 
maximum consistency. Any new general rule will have some 
inconsistencies with his other beliefs/customs - in this 
regard, it is an unphilosophical probability, in that by its 
general nature it is bound to contradict some very refined 
customs. But it is also philosophical, in that it provides us 
with opportunity (as Dirac's equation did) to achieve an even 
greater level of consistency. The push-and-pull of conflicting 
general rules leads us from our gross customs towards in­
creasingly refined ones. 
Thus, by adopting an internal/ subjective standard to­
wards general rules, we can better understand why Hume 
believes general rules can lead to normative positions. But in 
what way is it a consequence or boon to skepticism? The 
above-cited passage shares a similar tone with the final 
passages of Book I, inwhich Hume arrives at his "happy-face 
skepticism." SW'prisingly, skepticism provides a solid foun­
dation for normative judgments about causality - this con­
clusion parallels in opposite direction the one on page 269, 
where Hume realizes that "in yield[ing] to the current of 
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nature, in submitting to my sense and understanding ... I 
shewmost perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles." 
This question, whether a skeptical project can create a Ifsci­
ence of human nature," rises beyond causality andframes the 
interpretation of the entire Treatise. 
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